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Abstract 
 
The discourse on nihilism in the German-speaking world continues to take its orientation 
primarily from Friedrich Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism as a historical movement of the 
decline of values. This means that the aspects of nihilism that are not tied to specific epochs 
and cultures are not accorded due importance (I). In order to make a reappraisal of nihilism 
that does justice to these objective contents, I will present a classification of types of nihilism 
and of arguments that support it. The discussion of the typology of the principal meanings of 
nihilism points to a loss in relevance of conceptions that take their orientation from Nietzsche 
(II). The discussion of the arguments testifies to the importance of objective knowledge in the 
justification of nihilism (III). 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The discourse on nihilism in the German-speaking world continues to take its orientation 
primarily from Friedrich Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism as a historical movement of the 
decline of values. In contrast, I will argue here for the relevance of the objective contents of 
nihilism. “Objectivity” means more than the independence of knowledge from individual 
factors such as attitudes, opinions, or beliefs. It also designates a feature of the description 
of states of affairs with an epoch-transcending and a cross-cultural character. 
Anthropological definitions of the human, the irreversibility of modernization processes, and 
cosmic framework conditions—to mention just a few aspects from the recent literature—have 
a significance for justifications of nihilism that can be captured at best in part by conceptions 
that go back to Nietzsche.1 
However, Nietzsche’s engagement with nihilism exhibits a complex structure that bears 
on different types of and arguments for nihilism that are not easy to classify. Sometimes it is 
                                                
1 Exemplary for the recourse to anthropological definitions is Marmysz 2003, for the 
irreversibility of modernization processes Brassier 2007; for the reference to cosmological 
framework conditions, see Smith 2003, Kanitscheider 2008, and Hansen 2012. 
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impossible to distinguish clearly between them or they are informed by opposing definitions. 
Nietzsche's view of nihilism is in part positive and in part negative. He regards it, on the one 
hand, as unavoidable, but also, on the other, as surmountable. However, describing the 
ways in which the current discourse refers to Nietzsche does not necessitate a global 
reconstruction of his understanding of nihilism. It suffices to focus on two moments that 
dominate the German discourse, even allowing that this is of course diverse: the moments of 
the value-determination and of the historicity of nihilism. Nietzsche’s wide-ranging concept of 
value includes, among other things, epistemological, moral, religious, and aesthetic ideals, 
purposes, and rankings, all of which he regards as postulates.2 Through the self-devaluation 
of “highest values,”3 Nietzsche argued, European nihilism was unfolding as a historical 
movement 4 to which he wanted to oppose the “revaluation of all values” as a 
“countermovement.”5 Even though Nietzsche regarded the forms assumed by nihilism as 
culture-dependent—he was aware of the peculiarities of Russian nihilism and described the 
differences between Christian and Buddhist nihilism6—he also assumed that the possibility of 
overcoming nihilism was subject to specific historical preconditions. However, his position on 
European nihilism remained ambiguous. Whereas the “countermovement” sought to create a 
non-nihilistic culture, his likewise future-oriented doctrine of eternal recurrence signified the 
“most extreme form” or the “completion” of European nihilism.7 The latter claim shares with 
the thesis of the objectivity of nihilism, which is in essence opposed to Nietzsche’s evaluative 
and historical understanding, the view that nihilism has properties that are independent of 
individual or collective action. 
Examples of the one-sidedness of the German discourse on nihilism can be found in 
                                                
2Kuhn 1992, pp. 121ff. 
3 Nietzsche 1980ff., vol. 12, p. 350 (NF 1887, 9[35]), translation from Nietzsche 1968, p. 9. 
Nietzsche’s posthumous fragments are cited using the abbreviation “NF” 
[NachgelasseneFragmente], the year of authorship, and the numbering of the editors of 
Nietzsche 1980ff. 
4See ibid. pp. 211ff. (NF 1886/87, 5[71]). 
5Ibid., vol. 13, p. 190 (NF 1887/88, 11[411]), translation from Nietzsche 1968, p. 3. 
6 On Russian nihilism, see ibid., vol. 9, pp. 127f. (NF 1880, 4[108]); on Buddhism, see ibid., 
vol. 6, p. 186, and vol. 13, p. 267 (NF 1888, 14[91]). 
7Ibid., vol. 12, p. 213 (NF 1886/87 5[71]), translation from Nietzsche 1968, p. 36, and p. 339 
(NF 1887 9[1]). 
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the relevant lexicon entries on nihilism, which assume that Nietzsche’s understanding of 
nihilism remains representative up to the present day.8 Thus, the article on nihilism in the 
HistorischesWörterbuch der Philosophie asserts that: “Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism 
has become increasingly widespread since the end of the nineteenth century.”9 In the 
corresponding article in the second edition of the Enzyklopädie Philosophie und 
Wissenschaftstheoriepublished almost thirty years later, Nietzsche’s writings are introduced 
as the locus of “theoretical reflection on nihilism.”10 That nihilism developed into a “dominant 
attitude toward life” in the twentieth century, it is claimed, is a development “triggered by 
Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the ‘devaluation of all values’.”11 
The reappraisal of the discourse on nihilism presented in what follows does not claim to 
be based on an in-depth critique of Nietzsche’s position and its still influential reception. 
Rather, it takes as its starting point a review of the relevance of current understandings of 
nihilism. It aims to demonstrate that the arguments for nihilism have objective content and to 
contrast this with conceptions that take their orientation from Nietzsche. The contemporary 
discourse fans out—not only in Germany—into a variety of types and related arguments. By 
“types” I mean concepts through which a variety of similar linguistic meanings are 
consolidated within main groups, and are thus subjected to a certain order. If nihilism is 
understood as a doctrine of denial [Lehre der Bestreitung], then nihilism has as many 
meanings as there are objects that can be denied on systematic grounds. Following the 
typology drawn up by Donald A. Crosby that has been mainly discussed in the Anglo-Saxon 
literature on nihilism, I classify the philosophical meanings according to their object 
domains.12 Thus I differentiate between political, moral, epistemological, cosmic, 
                                                
8 Riedel 1978; Goerdt and Müller-Lauter 1984; Strube 1994; Großheim 2003; Himmelmann 
2008; Gerlach, 2010; Schwemmer and Wimmer 2013. Nietzsche also occupies a prominent 
place, though not a discourse-defining one, in non-German publications on nihilism. See, for 
example, Vercellone 1992, pp. 56ff.; Slocombe 2006, pp. 15ff.; Metzger 2009. 
9Goerdt and Müller-Lauter 1984, column 851. 
10Schwemmer and Wimmer 2013, p. 583. 
11Ibid., p. 584. 
12 Crosby 1988, pp. 8–36. Crosby’s classification is among the most comprehensive 
presentations and has been the subject of many discussions; see Carr 1992, Pratt 2001, 
Slocombe 2006, Storey 2011, Wallace 2011, Shahabi and Mojdegani 2012.  
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metaphysical, and existential nihilism.13 A variety of arguments have been offered in support 
of the in part mutually contradictory theories of nihilism represented within these object 
domains. Even though the arguments are often specific to a particular subject area or a 
theory, I will discuss them separately.14 On the one hand, this approach takes their in part 
plural applicability to different subject areas into account; on the other hand, it allows me to 
concentrate on the reference to forms of objective knowledge. 
 
II.1 Types of Nihilism 
That nihilism fans out into diverse types that must be taken into consideration when 
defending the thesis that it has an objective basis is presumably a reflection of the 
differentiation that marks the development of modern discourse structures. In addition, 
however, the wealth of meanings is also a reflection of the broad understanding of the 
concept presupposed by the definition of nihilism as a doctrine of denial.15 The first two types 
distinguished in the following discussion fall within the scope of practical philosophy; the next 
three fall within the scope of theoretical philosophy; and the final type falls within the domain 
of anthropology. The aim of the discussion is to isolate the types that are relevant for the 
discourse on nihilism and to relate them to Nietzsche's understanding. 
(a) The concept of political nihilism takes up the use of the word in nineteenth-century 
Russian literature and politics on which Nietzsche also drew. According to this usage, 
political nihilism can be understood as a rejection of political structures and social authorities 
and of the social and cultural modes of understanding that support them. It is bound up with 
the aspiration to construct an alternative social order.16 I propose to ignore the limitation that 
the utopian character of this definition of political nihilism places on negation. Even though as 
a result the definition no longer does justice to nineteenth-century usage, it takes up the 
                                                
13 Crosby's classification ignores metaphysical nihilism. Further types have been proposed in 
the discourse on the nihilism, to which I will refer in the footnotes and the concluding 
remarks. My discussion will be confined to the Anglo-Saxon, the German, and, via 
Vercellone (1992) and D’Agostini (2009), the Italian discourses on nihilism. 
14 The separation between types and arguments follows a proposal of Crosby 1988. 
15 I will discuss two narrower definitions of nihilism in section III.3.2. 
16Crosby 1988, pp. 10 and 35. 
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twentieth- and twenty-first-century phenomena of nihilism which are aimed, not at 
transforming society, but at its destruction. Here I am thinking in particular of the connection 
between nihilism and Nazi rule made, for example, by Theodor W. Adorno and Karl Löwith.17 
Anticipating the arguments for nihilism, one can already observe that political nihilism as the 
destruction of the social is the only concept for which no convincing justification of the 
associated conceptions is conceivable and which is not thematized by Nietzsche either. 
(b) In contrast to political nihilism, the object of moral nihilism, which deals with justifications 
of morality (and therefore could also be called ethical nihilism), lies within philosophy.18 
Whereas in the nineteenth century moral nihilism remained central to the philosophical denial 
of validity claims, today its thematization has migrated to a large extent into the academic 
disciplines where it occupies only a peripheral position.19 Nietzsche still sought to counteract 
the decline of values, which he attributed to the culture of decreasing religious faith, with a 
new moral nihilism.20 The fact that moral nihilism has not met with social recognition is 
largely due to the fact that universalizable (non-egoistic) ethical conceptions have 
successively become established.  
Because of the lack of relevance of moral nihilism, I will limit myself here to definitions that 
subdivide the heterogeneous group of meanings falling under this heading into amoralism, 
moral subjectivism, and egoism.21Amoralismrejects all moral principles and postulates the 
possibility of a life beyond all morality (e.g. Marquis de Sade); moral subjectivism considers 
moral judgments to be individual and arbitrary matters (e.g. Nietzsche); egoism attaches 
more weight to the pursuit of one’s own interests than to the interests of others (e.g. Max 
Stirner). 
(c) Epistemic nihilism asserts the relativity of the linguistic meaning of concepts and the 
                                                
17Adorno 1973, pp. 369-374; Löwith 1940. 
18 D’Agostini (2009, p. 5) in contrast to Carr (1992, p. 18, see n. 29) also calls moral nihilism 
axiological nihilism. 
19 Schröder, 2005, p. 255; Darwall et al. 1992, pp. 180ff. 
20Schröder 2005, pp. 23ff. Schröder’s concept of moral nihilism, which is compatible with my 
definition, differs from Nietzsche’s understanding. 
21 I borrow this tripartite division, but not all elements of the definitions or the examples, from 
Crosby 1988, p. 11. 
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impossibility of knowledge.22 The classical locus for this type of nihilism is Nietzsche’s 
posthumous fragments. In this context Nietzsche’s criticism is directed primarily against the 
definitional power and the epistemic diktat of the sciences. However, one of the decisive 
changes in nihilism over the past century is that it demarcates itself less from the sciences 
than did nineteenth-century nihilism, Russian nihilism excepted.23 Nevertheless, despite the 
increased attention paid to scientific arguments fundamental reservations are asserted 
concerning knowledge, a point to which I will return later. The following two types take into 
account the main forms of the revitalized nihilistic appeal to science. 
(d) Cosmic nihilism, which Nietzsche thematized if at all only in passing24 and historically was 
defended together with epistemic nihilism, takes as its starting point the insignificance of 
human beings in the universe. According to Albert Camus, for example, the cosmic 
irrelevance of human beings is reflected in the unintelligibility and strangeness of the 
universe.25 By the same token, however, cosmic nihilism can also appeal to the findings of 
natural science. The expansiveness and emptiness of the universe, for example, are 
supposed to demonstrate the nullity of what invests human life with significance. 
(e) Whereas cosmic nihilism refers to scientific knowledge whose claim to truth it either 
rejects or accepts, metaphysical nihilism sees itself as a purely philosophical doctrine (like 
moral nihilism). This form of nihilism denies the existence of being or the divisibility of its 
elements; in other words, it asserts the universal or limited existence of nothingness.26 The 
spectrum of the variants that fall under this rubric includes as main directions themes from 
existential philosophy and positions in analytic philosophy. Martin Heidegger’s concept of 
nihilism can be regarded as an outstanding example from existential philosophy. European 
                                                
22 I subsume Slocombe’s (2006) concept of postmodern nihilism under the epistemic type. 
Carr (1992, p. 17) limits epistemic nihilism to the denial of knowledge and introduces the new 
type of aletheological nihilism for the denial of truth, which (as in Richard Rorty) need not 
imply renouncing knowledge as such. 
23 See the references to the more recent literature in footnotes 1 above and 28 below. 
24 Among the relatively rare passages are Nietzsche 1980ff., vol. 1, p. 759; vol. 3, pp. 467–
69, and vol. 13, pp. 488f. (NF 1888, 16[25]). However, the cosmological meaning of the 
doctrine of eternal recurrence can also be understood in a nihilistic sense; see n. 7 above. 
25Camus 1991, pp. 14f and 18f. 
26 Carr (1992, pp. 17f.) and subsequently Slocombe (2006, p. 6) also refer to this form of 
nihilism interchangeably as ontological nihilism. 
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metaphysics as a whole is marked for Heidegger by a progressive oblivion of being 
[Seinsvergessenheit]. “"Metaphysics as metaphysics is nihilism proper".”27 In analytic 
philosophy the assertion that empty worlds are possible or the assertion that fundamental 
objects are indivisible are referred to as metaphysical nihilism.28 
(f) The final type, existential nihilism, denies that life has meaningfulness: “existence (action, 
suffering, willing, feeling) is devoid of meaningfulness.”29 In the context of the discourse on 
nihilism it makes sense to distinguish between meaning or relevance [Bedeutung] and 
meaningfulness [Sinn]. Meaning, according to my proposal, is the expression of a connection 
between objects (things, states of affairs, events, etc.) in language. An object acquires 
meaning through its relation to other objects. The concept of meaningfulness, which 
presupposes meaning, opens meaning up to interrogation as to its “why” and “wherefore.”30 
Existential nihilism can be understood on these definitions as the assertion of 
meaninglessness [Sinnlosigkeit], which need not imply that human life is without 
meaning[Bedeutungslosigkeit des menschlichenLebens]. 
Questions about the reasons and purposes of human actions do not admit of 
conclusive answers. A world endowed with meaningfulness requires the undiscovered, the 
unknown, and sometimes also the strange and the mysterious. On this conception, 
meaninglessness is not only a function of the lack of material connection, the dearth of 
linguistic comprehension, or the absence of reasons and purposes. It would also pertain, 
paradoxically enough, even if all reasons and purposes were known. 
 
II.2 Concluding Remarks 
Three types of nihilism—political, moral, and epistemic—have only secondary relevance for 
discussions of the objectivity of nihilism. Political nihilism cannot be justified in a convincing 
                                                
27Heidegger 1991, Vol. 4, p. 205 (emphasis in the original). 
28 Coggins (2011) was the first to present a comprehensive review of the numerous 
publications on metaphysical nihilism in analytic philosophy. 
29 Nietzsche 1980ff., vol. 12, p. 366 (NF 1887, 9[60]), (translation amended from Nietzsche 
1968, p. 318; see Crosby 1988, p. 35. Carr (1992, p. 18) refers to this form of nihilism as 
axiological nihilism (in contrast to D’Agostini 2009, p. 5; see n. 18 above). 
30 Blumenberg 2010, p. 79. 
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way; moral nihilism must be regarded as historically superseded; and epistemological 
nihilism has been discredited above all by the success of scientific knowledge. 
The comparison with less differentiated typologies is conducive to evaluating the 
relations with Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism. Karl Jaspers distinguishes between a 
form of nihilism that refers to values as opposed to one that refers to being. Whereas the 
former rejects “all value and meaningfulness” and asserts that “reality lacks value and 
meaningfulness” (Jaspers cites materialism as an example), the latter considers reality to be 
“worthy of destruction” (Jaspers cites the example of Buddhism).31 Insofar as Nietzsche 
thinks that “belief in valuelessness” is an implication of nihilism,32 it makes more sense to 
align him with the value-related type of nihilism. According to my classification, the political, 
moral, and existential types of nihilism can be subsumed approximately under value nihilism. 
Although the cosmic and the metaphysical types need not regard being as worthy of 
destruction, they fall under the nihilism that refers to being because their object is the relation 
between nothingness and being. The epistemic type cannot be subsumed unambiguously 
under Jaspers’s classification, because relativity of linguistic meaning and impossibility of 
knowledge may refer either to being or to values. 
A related typology that also consists of just two classes has been proposed by John 
Marmysz. Marmysz classifies contemporary discussions according to whether they view 
nihilism as a specific feature of a culture or as a universal phenomenon.33 Nietzsche’s talk of 
“European nihilism” should be placed alongside the culture-dependent understanding. 
Applied to the classification of types, this understanding applies primarily to political nihilism 
and the non-egoistic form of moral nihilism. 
Whereas the classification of the types of nihilism remains open for an understanding 
of nihilism that takes its orientation from Nietzsche,34 it also provides initial pointers to its loss 
                                                
31 Jaspers 1919, pp. 252f. 
32 Nietzsche 1980ff., vol. 12, p. 292 (NF, 1886/87, 7[8]), translation from Nietzsche 1968, p. 
11. 
33 Marmysz 2003, p. 5. 
34 Kuhn 1992, pp. 132ff., presents a similar analysis of Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism into 
domains. This analysis differentiates four groups of subject domains. The first includes 
religion, morality, and philosophy (similar to the moral and in part the metaphysical type). The 
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of relevance vis-à-vis divergent views. 
 
III. Arguments for Nihilism 
In this section I will examine the soundness of arguments that claim to justify nihilism on 
objective grounds. I will begin with the arguments that point back to the early history of 
nihilism and cannot be correlated unambiguously with the subsequent groups (God and 
reason). Then I will discuss the scientifically-based justifications (the place of human beings 
in nature, metaphysics) and conclude by addressing the lifeworld-based justifications 
(temporal existence, contingency).35 Justifications that appeal to scientific knowledge are 
based on knowledge supported by arguments or on knowledge that is compatible with 
systematic observation or experimentally generated data. Lifeworld-based justifications, by 
contrast, are characterized by their immediacy and the obviousness of the understanding of 
their objects—that is, by properties that are at odds with non-intuitive and critical scientific 
knowledge. However, it is not always possible to make a clear distinction between the two 
groups of arguments.36 The sequence in which they are presented should not be taken to 
reflect any preference. 
Additional arguments are cited in support of the objectivity of nihilism, arguments which 
in part do not fit into the proposed arrangement. Thus Stanley Rosen’s language analytical 
justification of nihilism as “permanent danger to the human condition”37 can be assimilated 
only in part to arguments that appeal to reason. Arguments that refer to phenomena such as 
                                                                                                                                                     
second group has a scientific character (similar to the epistemic and in part the cosmic type). 
The third group deals with politics and economics (in part similar to the political type). Finally, 
the fourth group thematizes the domain of art, which I leave to one side because of its 
special status (ibid., p. 188). Although Nietzsche classifies certain artistic movements as 
expressions of nihilism (ibid., pp. 167ff.), at times he treats aesthetics as a force opposed to 
nihilism (ibid., pp. 125ff.). 
35 Crosby orders the arguments as follows: God, the place of human beings in nature, 
suffering, temporal existence, reason, will, and other people. I do not use the third argument 
or  the last two, in part because they are not convincing as arguments for nihilism, in part 
because they have only slight relevance or do not offer any new considerations by 
comparison with the other arguments. Crosby does not consider the metaphysical arguments 
or  the arguments from contingency. 
36 Scientific knowledge remains dependent on life-world knowledge, which is shaped in turn 
by scientific knowledge. 
37 Rosen 1969, p. 206. 
10 
the transience of temporal existence, human suffering, or undesirable cultural trends38 can 
be objective only in a narrower sense that includes the possibility of overcoming of nihilism. 
Although the discussion of the arguments does not make any claim to completeness, it does 
claim to cover in essence the full spectrum of philosophical justifications of the objectivity of 
nihilism. 
 
III.1 God 
That nihilism (in its various manifestations) is a consequence of a culture of waning belief in 
the Christian Deity inaugurates the discourse on nihilism cofounded by Nietzsche.39 
Nietzsche calls the death of God “the greatest recent event” whose “long plenitude and 
sequence of breakdown, destruction, ruin, and cataclysm” is at present not even 
foreseeable.40 He fluctuates between the impression that the people of his time were already 
"straying as through an infinite space”41 and the assumption that the nihilism attributable to 
the decline of religion is a long drawn-out process whose destructive effect will be 
“accomplished” only in the future.42 The uncertainty over what to make of the fundamental 
change in religious attitudes that began in the nineteenth century and is not confined to 
Christianity continues to the present day. The spectrum of views extends from the 
declaration of a “post-religious era” (Herbert Schnädelbach) to the affirmation of a “spiritual 
reality of our age” (Charles Taylor).43 However, there is broad consensus among the 
divergent positions on secularization that the nihilistic scenario that Nietzsche assumes on 
the grounds of the decline in religious faith has not materialized. It is not easy to assess the 
objectivity of this argument because it has as its object both subjective religious convictions 
                                                
38 See, for example, Crosby 1988, pp. 62ff. (transience of temporal existence) and 55ff. 
(human suffering); Kuhn, 1992, pp. 133ff. (the role of undesirable cultural trends in the 
reconstruction of Nietzsche's understanding of nihilism). 
39 Among the prominent historically influential sources of nihilism I include, in addition to the 
Russian nihilism, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s critique of idealism (see Gawoll 1989) and 
Nietzsche’s nihilism fragments. 
40 Nietzsche 1980ff., vol. 3, p. 573, translation from Nietzsche 1974, p. 279. 
41Ibid., p. 481, translation from Nietzsche 1974, p. 181. 
42 On the insurmountability of nihilism, see n. 7 above. 
43 See Schnädelbach 2005; Taylor 2007, p. 509. Taylor’s assessment is subject to 
Nietzsche’s critique of the nihilism of religion. 
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and culturally overarching religious practices or their absence. 
 
III.2 Reason 
Among the arguments that appeal to reason are the justifications of epistemic nihilism. This 
form of nihilism has been justified in part based on the constitutive weakness of the human 
cognitive faculty, in part from the world’s lack of an intelligible structure.44 But since epistemic 
nihilism now plays only a subordinate role, I will limit myself to a fundamental argument that 
justifies the principled reservations about knowledge mentioned above. 
The argument can be summarized as follows: even if there are good reasons for the 
truth and the well-foundedness of both our lifeworld-based and our scientific assumptions 
about the world, it cannot be precluded that they are false; at the same time, it is unlikely that 
a whole system of assumptions will turn out to be erroneous.45 In addition, the claim to 
validity of knowledge could be relativized as a result in such a way that the world proves to 
be partially unknowable.46 Because these reservations cannot be inferred from the cognitive 
faculty itself, but call for higher-level reflection, the concept of reason provides a suitable 
rubric for this argument. Insofar as the reservations about knowledge do not assert that 
knowledge is impossible, they do not justify epistemic nihilism. Rather, they provide the 
framework for the claims to objectivity of other types of nihilism.  
However, together with the premise that a meaningful existence is impossible without 
world knowledge [Welterkenntnis], they serve to justify existential nihilism. “World 
knowledge” is based on the idea of a desirable, continually advancing, or even complete, 
knowledge toward which reason strives through its capacity for transcendence and which is 
capable of transcending any finite knowledge. But cognitive expectations geared to ideal 
claims are thwarted by the always necessarily limited contents of knowledge and by insight 
                                                
44Crosby 1988, pp. 76ff. 
45 Good reasons for the truth of hypotheses about the world are provided, for example, by 
the inference to the best explanation. That the falsity of hypotheses about the world cannot 
be excluded is shown (strictly speaking only for science) by K. R. Popper’s falsificationism. 
And W. v. O. Quine argues that knowledge cannot be refuted as a whole.  
46 On the possibility that there is a material limit to knowledge, see section III.3.1.b.i. 
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into the reservations about knowledge.47 As Marmysz has shown, this form of justification 
can be found in different cultures spanning different epochs. It contrasts with Nietzsche’s 
theory of the development of nihilism, which postulates that despair about the unattainability 
of world knowledge represents an underdeveloped and temporally limited stage of nihilism.48 
 
III.3 Scientifically-based Arguments 
III.3.1 Human beings’ place in nature 
The arguments that refer to human beings’ place in nature differ from the two preceding and 
the following metaphysical arguments in their reference to experience. In contrast 
thematizations of nihilism that take their orientation from Nietzsche’s approach, they reflect 
the change in attitude to scientific—specifically, natural scientific—knowledge. They not only 
support the thesis of the meaninglessness of human existence, but also the thesis of the 
irrelevance of human beings in the universe. In an attempt to structure the arguments I will 
introduce three subdivisions. The first concerns formal aspects, whereas the other two 
comprise sets of material arguments. 
 
(a) Two opposing strategies can be distinguished for justifying nihilism by recourse to 
the methods of natural science. Scientific methods can be regarded as nihilistic because they 
do not capture phenomena of the meaningfulness of human existence.49 However, one can 
also derive an argument for existential nihilism if, conversely, this limit of scientific methods is 
not presupposed. What would be the nihilistic implications of these methods if they were also 
potentially applicable to phenomena of meaningfulness? In the words of Max Weber, the 
notion of universal applicability would be associated with the belief “that if one but wished 
one could learn[a progressively more general knowledge of the conditions of life to which one 
is subject] at any time. Hence, it means that in principle there are no mysterious incalculable 
                                                
47 Jaspers 1919, pp. 255f.; Marmysz 2003, pp. 68-74. 
48Marmysz 2003, ibid. Neither Marmysz nor Nietzsche uses the expression “world 
knowledge.” 
49For example, Crosby 1988, pp. 46ff. 
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forces [...]. This means that the world is disenchanted.”50 Since the era during which magical 
notions were refuted and discredited on scientific grounds must be regarded as in essence 
concluded, I propose to use the expression transparency to describe the nihilistic implication 
of belief in the progressive disclosure of the world by science. “Transparency” in this context 
refers to naturalistic knowledge of the conditions of human life that makes a claimed 
objectivity and is always open to revision. It corresponds to what Weber calls “general 
knowledge” and, together with cultural and subjective phenomena, also includes the question 
of the meaningfulness of life. 
It is to be expected that in future the limits of transparency will continue to extend from 
middle-range objects to extremely small (submicroscopic) objects and to extremely large 
objects (on the scale of the universe). But where it need no longer be assumed that the world 
contains anything unknown, the world loses its capacity to ground meaningfulness.51 
Formally speaking, the objectifying method of the natural sciences leads to nihilism.52 
 
(b) As a first set of material arguments for nihilism I would like to cite the cosmological 
arguments. Since the end of the last century they can be based on interpretations of new 
astronomical observations which lend these arguments virtually unparalleled weight. 
Nevertheless, they continue to depend on the validity of scientific theories that, on account of 
the aforementioned reservation concerning knowledge, have the character of in varying 
degrees well-founded hypotheses. Among the outstanding arguments for existential and 
cosmic nihilism I would like to highlight the following three, for each of which independent 
empirical evidence can be provided: 
i) Limits of knowledge: According to the standard model of contemporary cosmology, the 
origin of the universe lies beyond space and time, which came into existence together 
with the universe. Empirically speaking, this represents a potentially insuperable limit to 
knowledge which, in so far as it refers to the universe, tends to lend the whole system 
                                                
50 Weber 1946, p. 139 (translation amended, some emphasis added). 
51 See section II.1f above. 
52 On the nihilism of transparency, see Schiemann 2013. 
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of knowledge an insular character. 
ii) Lack of meaning: The assumption that there are chance events can also be interpreted 
as a limit to knowledge. It is a special form of knowledge—namely, causal knowledge—
whose negation asserts the existence of chance. Whereas chance refers to what lacks 
a cause, and only to that extent lacks connection, lack of meaning refers to the lack of 
a relationship between events or objects as such, whether causal or non-
causal.53Chance and lack of meaning coincide only from a causal perspective. 
The evolution of the universe points tononcausal conditions of emergence of matter 
and life: Up to now the magnitude of and relationship between the constants of nature, 
without which life in the universe would be impossible, could be explained only as a 
result of chance events—or, alternatively, it could not be explained if chance was not 
admitted as an explanation. To this must be added the phenomenon of chance in 
quantum mechanics. As a fundamental theory of matter, quantum mechanics only 
admits assertions of probability about elementary processes. Hence, it allows a 
conception of matter for which all structure formation proceeds from individual events 
by chance.54 
iii) Coming end:The counterpart of the conjecture that the past and present states of the 
universe are governed by chance are the scenarios of its future decline, which have 
become calculable only in recent times. Given the progressive increase in the 
luminosity of the sun, it is conjectured that the terrestrial biosphere will continue to exist 
for around one billion (109) years.55 Recent measurements of a variety of astronomical 
phenomena point to the fact that the universe is undergoing an accelerated expansion 
that will lead to the dissolution of all matter into radiation in the—even in cosmic 
terms—very distant future (1032 years).56 Hence it must be considered highly unlikely 
that the doctrine of eternal recurrence can be justified in cosmological terms, as 
                                                
53 See sections II.1f above and III.4.2 below. 
54 On cosmological and quantum-mechanical chance, see the introduction in Mainzer 2007. 
Even though they are fundamental for understanding quantum mechanics, here I ignore the 
correlations that exist between elementary particles. 
55 Bounama et al. 2004, p. 104. 
56 Among the numerous relevant accounts is Keller 2004. 
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Nietzsche still hoped.57 
 
(c) The second set of material arguments refers to the immanent history of the 
evolution of life and culture on Earth. This can be reconstructed is generally accepted as an 
established scientific fact. Human origins are becoming increasingly transparent. The more 
successful the reconstruction, the more meaningless the object of reconstruction becomes.58 
Similar arguments to those offered in support of the nihilistic interpretation of cosmology can 
be made concerning the role of chance events. Whereas the emergence of the conditions of 
life on Earth is presumably due to an improbable constellation of necessary factors (distance 
from the Sun, existence of and distance from the Moon, etc.),59 the ensuing biological 
evolution may depend on the chance confluence of causal chains of events (mutation, 
extreme environmental conditions, etc.). Cultural change is also attributed to noncausal 
factors that govern the paths of development.60 
Finally, when it comes to the evolution of life and culture it cannot be ruled out that 
humanity will become extinct long before it reaches its cosmological end. Species are dying 
out in spite of the successful history of adaptation.61 The development of civilization is in part 
at odds with the preservation of life on Earth (e.g. weapons of mass destruction, 
anthropogenic climate change). However, these nihilistic threats are not unavoidable 
constellations, assuming that it lies within human power to eliminate their causes. Therefore, 
the associated arguments should be regarded as arguments for objective nihilism only with 
qualification.62 
 
                                                
57Moles (1990) demonstrates that a universe expanding at an accelerating rate is 
incompatible with the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Theories that postulate a cyclical or an 
immutable universe are at present more difficult to reconcile with empirical data. They justify 
the thesis of cosmic boredom (see section III. 4.1a below). 
58Stamos 2008, pp. 215ff. 
59Schurz 2010, pp. 89ff. 
60 See Knöbl 2007. 
61Schurz 2010, pp. 57ff. 
62 Nihilistic interpretations of cosmology and the theory of evolution also play a role in 
justifications of moral nihilism (Smith 2003; Stamos 2008, pp. 222ff.). 
16 
III.3.2 Metaphysics 
Conceptually speaking, metaphysical arguments are more broadly defined than metaphysical 
nihilism, since they have an ontological and/or a priori character. The concept of the a priori 
does not mean the independence of arguments from experience in principle but allows that 
they can be based on special experience. By taking a priori arguments into consideration, for 
example, skeptical arguments can also be included in the group of metaphysical 
arguments.63 Within the group of metaphysical arguments, I want to highlight those that refer 
to nothingness. 
Three main groups of meanings can be distinguished within the concept of 
nothingness.64 First, nothingness as the epitome of all negation refers to what is negated in 
each case or, as the epitome of all destruction, to what is destroyed in each case, and hence 
has a subordinate status. This broad conception, as already noted, has shaped the 
definitions of the types of nihilism presented. It generally has a non-a priori character and 
only in exceptional cases does it have ontological content. Hence, it has only slight relevance 
for the metaphysical arguments.  
Second, nothingness acquires an ontological meaning when it is understood in 
opposition to being and is placed on an equal footing with it. In ancient atomism, for example, 
nothingness or the void is accorded equal status as a principle with being or the plenum, to 
whose constitutive conditions nothingness belongs.65 Arguments that appeal to nothingness 
in a sense opposed to being often play a role in analytic justifications of metaphysical nihilism 
and claim objective—because universal—validity.  
Third, nothingness is a limit concept (Jaspers) that refers to what is not valid or does 
not exist, even though it is not possible to refer to nothing. Death is a paradigmatic example 
of this meaning of nothingness insofar as it has “metaempirical dimensions ..., or better, 
lacks any dimension at all” (Vladimir Jankélévitch).66 As a limit concept, nothingness can be 
                                                
63Amoralism, for example—that is, the claim that moral principles are impossible—can be 
justified in skeptical terms; see Sinnott-Armstrong 2006. 
64On the different meanings, see, for example, Gloy 1983 and Sorensen 2012. 
65Diels and Kranz 1971 f., fragments 68 A37, A44 and A49. 
66 Jankélévitch 2008, p. 6. 
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accorded priority over being for speculative purposes and can be endowed with objectivity.67 
Arguments that refer to nothingness can be described as the real nihilistic arguments. 
They occupy the largest place among the metaphysical arguments, but do not need to have 
either an ontological or an a priori character. Nietzsche no more understands nihilism in 
ontological terms68 or deduces it a priori that he grounds it metaphysically in the sense 
introduced here (which is neither historical nor evaluative). 
 
III.4 Lifeworld-based Arguments 
III.4.1 Temporal existence. 
Where temporal existence remains empty or comes to an absolute end it can provide a point 
of reference for objective justifications of existential nihilism. 
 
(a) Empty temporal existence is called boredom. As a cultural phenomenon, it arises in 
tandem with modern subjectification processes and the accompanying transformation of 
attitudes toward religious belief.69 Blaise Pascal’s initial paradigmatic thematization of 
boredom already invokes nihilistic contexts: “Man’s condition: Inconstancy, boredom, 
anxiety.”70 In order to escape the boredom that leads people to feel “their nullity”71 they seek 
diversion; however, this robs life of any enduring content and diversion is not to be had in 
unlimited amounts. Pascal already anticipated a connection that will probably become 
predominant in future: the more secure conditions of life become, the greater becomes the 
portion of life that is prey to boredom and cannot be filled with diversion.72 
The kind of boredom that overcomes people when diversion no longer provides relief 
Heidegger called “profound” boredom. In profound boredom the subject experiences the 
                                                
67 I use the expression “speculative” in the sense of the “speculative realism” advocated by 
Brassier (2007, p. 31) among others. 
68 Among the exceptions are Nietzsche 1980ff., vol. 10, p. 207 (NF 1882, 5[1] No. 179). 
69 See Goodstein 2005 and Schiemann and Breuninger 2015. 
70 Pascal 1995, fragment 34, p. 6 (Brunschvig fragment 127). 
71Ibid., fragment 622, p. 208 (Brunschvig fragment 131). 
72Ibid., pp. 37ff. (Brunschvig fragment 139). For present trends and those pointing into the 
future, see Bellebaum 1990, p. 159 and Döhlemann 1991, pp. 186ff.  
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world and her existence as indifferent.73 As Heidegger has shown, boredom involves a 
combination of subject- and object-related elements. It is both a “spiritual experience” and 
something that “comes towards us … from out of the things themselves.”74 In profound 
boredom the objective predominates from which the subject has no possibility of escape. 
Therefore, as conditions of life become increasingly secure in saturated societies, it is to be 
expected that the relevance of boredom as an objective basis of nihilism will increase.  
Although Nietzsche identified social structures that elicit boredom, he did not grasp 
their nihilistic character. He regarded boredom both at the individual and the cultural level as 
a transitory phenomenon that under certain circumstances is conducive to creativity.75 
 
(b) Death is the absolute end of individual life, assuming that there is no afterlife. The 
alleged inescapability of death comes to the fore with the ebbing of religion and the rise of 
the lifeworld-based belief that death is the irreversible dissolution of an organism.76 The 
lifeworld conviction is objective to the extent that it is based on direct experience of the death 
of others and assimilates scientific findings about the process of dying and death. Nihilism 
understands death as nothingness that devours the being of life. Insofar as death destroys 
the good of life, it is an evil.77 In particular, death is "an always possible nihilation of my 
possibles which is outside my possibilities."78 
The reference to death meets with more fundamental objections than any other 
argument for nihilism. The insight into the finitude of one's own existence, it is claimed, does 
not destroy meaningfulness. On the contrary, this insight founds meaningfulness in the first 
place and endows it with an effectiveness that transcends one's own lifetime. Because an 
                                                
73Heidegger 1995, pp. 74ff. 
74Ibid., p. 83 (emphasis in original). 
75 Among the objective structures that cause boredom Nietzsche rightly numbers the 
organization of work (Nietzsche 1980ff., vol. 2, p. 346); on the uses of boredom, see, for 
example, ibid., vol. 3, p. 408. It not only passes in the life of the individual, but it does not 
have any future either: ibid., vol. 9, pp. 67f. (NF 1880 3[81]). 
76 Ludwig Feuerbach’s insight that “death is thus the entire dissolution of your whole and 
complete being" was groundbreaking (Feuerbach 1967ff., vol. 1, p. 207; on this, see Bohrer 
1997). 
77 Nagel, 1979, p. 3f. 
78 Sartre, 1957, p. 537. 
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eternal life could not ground meaning, it would succumb to boredom.79 Nietzsche's 
understanding of death is also opposed to the nihilistic argument: without death "existence is 
worthless."80 By contrast, the immortal gods would be prey to boredom.81 
Against these objections must be cited, on the one hand, the familiar lifeworld 
perspective of the individual. From the individual's point of view, the destructive force of 
death erases the meaningfulness of his life entirely, even assuming that this is first 
constituted in the light of death. On the other hand, one could point out the categorical 
difference between the lifeworld experience from which boredom springs and immortality, 
which may never be experienced. To the extent that an eternal life is unimaginable, I cannot 
associate any familiar feeling with it. 
The more certain the end of life became, the greater became the efforts to extend it. To 
date science and technology allow nothing more than marginal increases in life expectancy. 
It cannot be ruled out that the natural foundations of life are compatible with only very limited 
artificial extensions of life. If death were to remain the unavoidable end of life, it would 
acquire the same nullifying objectivity as the finitude of earthly and cosmic conditions of life. 
However, it seems to be analytically impossible to refute the possibility of life after death.82 
But the increasing rationalization of our understanding of ourselves and the world will 
probably undermine the plausibility of belief in immortality. 
 
III.4.2 Contingency 
As the final group I would like to mention the arguments that appeal to the contingency of 
human existence. The concept of chance has a broader meaning than that of contingency.83 
Contingency affects objects that are possible but not necessary, without necessarily 
occurring by chance. Thus something can be conceived as contingent that happens to you 
                                                
79 Heidegger, for example, argues in Being and Time that death plays a role in constituting 
meaning; Williams 1978 argues that immortality would be tedious. 
80 Nietzsche 1980ff., vol. 8, p. 204 (NF 1875 11[18]). 
81 Ibid., vol. 6, p. 226. 
82 Wittwer 2009, pp. 25–40. 
83 I take my orientation from the relevant definitions presented by Stöckler (1999) and 
Brugger and Höring (1971ff.). 
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without your involvement and could just as well have been different or not have happened at 
all. Like chance, contingency is in a specific way at odds with meaning and hence with any 
associated meaningfulness.  
The objectivity of contingency exerts its corrosive effects on meaning in the modern era 
through the increasing interchangeability and mutability of forms of life and modes of work. 
The biographies of members of particular social strata are becoming comparable and hence 
more independent from local strictures. But, at the same time, choices between different 
forms of life and forms of work have multiplied. The role of life choices that are not forced 
upon us but could have been different is becoming more important. 
The correlate of the increasing importance of contingency in practical contexts, 
however, is that individuals have more control over their conduct of life and greater protection 
against the contingent intrusion of undesirable events. The more effective these possibilities 
for coping with contingency become, the more difficult it is to assess the importance of 
contingency. 84 This problem is already reflected in Nietzsche's critique of culture. Nietzsche 
fluctuates between the demand to recognize the contingency of modernity and the effort to 
curb this contingency through a more conscious conduct of life.85 
 
IV. Closing Remarks 
Today the assertion of the impossibility of knowledge rightly plays a more minor role than it 
did for Nietzsche as a justification for nihilism by comparison with the appeal to objective 
knowledge.86 The uncoupling of nihilistic discourses from discourses on the cultural 
consequences of changes in religious beliefs has contributed to this development (see sect. 
III.1). In the secular discourse on nihilism, an objective argument can be gleaned from the 
divergence between ideal knowledge claims and real contents of knowledge (see sect. III.2).  
The objectivity of arguments based on science and lifeworld experience is compatible 
                                                
84 On the lack of meaningfulness of contingency and how to cope with it, see Lübbe 1997, 
pp. 203ff. 
85 Nietzsche’s doctrine of amorfaticalls for recognition of contingency; for negative 
evaluations of the orientation to chance, see, inter alia, Nietzsche 1980ff., vol. 8, pp. 19f. (NF 
1875, 3[19]) and 32f.(NF 1875. 3[64]), and vol. 9, p. 19 (NF 1880, 1[63]). 
86 See footnotes 1 and 28. 
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with the epistemic reservations that serve as presuppositions for these arguments (ibid.). 
Among the scientific arguments, the cosmological and metaphysical arguments deal with 
objects beyond human control, but not the arguments that refer to scientific procedures and 
evolution. From a methodological perspective, meaningfulness is destroyed by the belief in 
the transparency of scientific procedure (see sect. III.3). The arguments based on lifeworld 
experience can be classified in a similar way into those that acknowledge human scopes for 
action (contingency) and those that deny them (boredom and death). But whereas the 
objectivity of scientific knowledge has a methodological foundation (and hence is also at our 
disposal), the arguments based on lifeworld experience call for a separate justification. In the 
case of boredom I pointed out the importance of object-like elements. Although it is not 
possible to demonstrate the objectivity of death as the ineluctable end of life, it can be 
affirmed with a high degree of plausibility (see sect. III.4). 
With this, the discussion of types and arguments has undergone a noticeable shift by 
comparison with Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism and the discourse that takes its 
orientation from this conception. I analyzed Nietzsche's conception in terms of the two 
moments of the value-determination and the historicity of nihilism. Among the different types 
of nihilism, political, moral and existential nihilism, and also in part epistemic nihilism, could 
be correlated with Nietzsche's understanding of nihilism (see sect. II.2). I left political nihilism 
to one side because it cannot be justified in a convincing way (see sect. II.1a). Thus the shift 
is, first, that the justifications offered by Nietzsche for moral and for epistemic nihilism have 
lost their persuasive power (see sect. II.1b and c). Second, the shift is justified by the weight 
of the justifications based on scientific findings to which conceptions oriented to Nietzsche 
cannot do justice (see sect. III.3.1 and 2). Third, existential nihilism derives its justification 
from the lifeworld-based arguments concerning boredom and death that do not play any role 
in Nietzsche’s thematization of nihilism (see sect. III.4.1). 
Translated by Ciaran Cronin 
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